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I. Introduction
As recent developments with VIOXX®, childhood anti-depressants, and
other prescription drugs have shown, two realities accompany prescription
drug use.  First, every prescription drug is designed to work miracles for some
class of patients.  Prescription drugs save patients’ lives, enhance their well-
being, or provide them with hope where hope was lacking.  Second, every
prescription drug also has potential side effects, unavoidable negative reactions
in a limited number of patients that can be very serious for those who
experience them.  In a system fraught with winners and losers, fashioning the
right balance between regulation and liability involves complicated legal,
scientific, and moral issues.  Given recent attention to the side effects that
patients can experience, now is an appropriate time to revisit the way
regulation and liability work within the prescription drug market.
As with all regulatory regimes, the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) manages public risk by issuing forward-looking
regulations that impose “prescriptive controls on risk-creating conduct
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1.  2 AM. LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: REPORTERS’
STUDY 83 (1991) [hereinafter REPORTERS’ STUDY] (stating that the regulatory agencies use their
expertise to “determine what risks to control, the level of control, and often the means of
control”).
2. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction
into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed [with the
Food and Drug Administration] is effective with respect to such drug.”).
3. REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 83.
4. Id. at 87.
before”1 potential injury can occur.  What makes the FDA different from other
federal agencies is that it must approve the risk-benefit analysis for each
product it regulates; each drug must be individually approved before a drug
company can make, market, or sell the drug.2  This drug-by-drug national risk
strategy defines the class of patients who are most likely to benefit from a
particular drug and assures that doctors are armed with warnings and
instructions so they can have a science-based understanding of the known
potential risks that each drug can pose.  A doctor then assesses a patient’s
personal risks and decides whether to issue that patient a prescription for a
specific drug.
Liability, on the other hand, is a backwards-looking compensation and
enforcement mechanism designed to manage private risks.  It looks at an
individual incident and requires a culpable party to compensate a person it
injures after the individual injury occurs, thereby providing strong incentives
“to control risky behavior in order to avoid or reduce future liability.”3
Liability falls short in the prescription drug context, because, as the
American Law Institute’s Reporters’ Study (Reporters’ Study) has pointed out,
“the tort system is ill-equipped to handle” public risks, particularly in cases
requiring “specialized experience in assessing risks and control measures.”4
In these situations, liability works best when it complements the federal
regulatory regime by requiring companies to pay compensation when they
cause harm by operating outside of its regulatory structure.
This article discusses the central issue of how liability works when a
prescription drug manufacturer fully complies with the FDA’s exacting
regulation by selling, marketing, and labeling prescription drugs with specific
FDA approval, yet, because of the nature of prescription drugs, a certain
percentage of patients experience significant foreseen and unforeseen side
effects.  In these situations, jurists have generally taken one of two paths.
Some judges, driven by compassion for a plaintiff or their own sense of
“justice,” reach their own determination that the alleged side effect is more
serious than the drug’s potential benefit and allow the plaintiff to pursue
compensation by claiming that the drug has a design or a failure to warn
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/1
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5. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840 (Neb. 2000)
(holding that the plaintiff could pursue a design defect claim against the makers of Accutane,
a prescription acne medication, and stating that comment k will only apply to prescription drugs
on a case by case basis and that, among other factors, the court will consider whether the drug’s
“benefits justify its risks”).
6. See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991) (“We hold that a drug
approved by the [FDA], properly prepared, compounded, packaged, and distributed, cannot as
a matter of law be ‘defective’ in the absence of proof of inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or
fraudulent information furnished by the manufacturer in connection with FDA approval.”).
7. See, e.g., id.; Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1988).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, THIRD: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD].
9. See John P. Swann, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., History of the FDA, at http://www.
fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/default.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005) (adapting sections from
A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (George T. Kurian ed., 1998)).
10. States’ treatment of drugs varied widely:
States exercised the principal control over domestically produced and distributed
foods and drugs in the 19th century, control that was markedly inconsistent from
defect.5  Other judges, adhering to the fundamental principles of tort law, have
concluded that there can be no design or warning defect when the FDA has
approved a drug’s specific design and warnings.6  These jurists require the
manufacturer to have committed an objective wrongful act in order for there
to be a basis for liability.7  The drafters of both the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and Restatement of Torts, Third have determined that the latter path
achieves a more accurate and desirable litigation and public policy outcome.8
Part II of this article reviews the development and application of the federal
regulatory scheme that controls the prescription drug market.  Part III
addresses the body of law that has been built over the last half century to
complement this regulatory regime.  Part IV discusses the appropriate liability
regime for prescription drugs in this country.  Part V examines the key public
policy issues that this liability regime raises.  Part VI explains the choices
available to courts for implementing this liability regime.  Part VII raises
causation issues that could undermine rational liability laws.  Part VIII briefly
concludes the article.
 II. Federal Regulation of the Prescription Drug Market
A. Development of FDA Authority to Regulate Prescription Drugs
Until the early twentieth century, the federal government generally left the
regulation of medicine and public health to the states.9  As a result, drugs were
generally unregulated, thus, leaving many ineffective and potentially harmful
drugs on the market.10  Individuals often made their own choices as to which
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state to state. . . . Federal authority was limited mostly to imported foods and
drugs.  Adulteration and misbranding of foods and drugs had long been a fixture
in the American cultural landscape, though the egregiousness of the problems
seemed to have increased by the late 19th century (or at least they became more
identifiable).
Id.
11. See Donna Hamilton, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., A Brief History of the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/history/Histext.htm (last
visited Sept. 28, 2005).
12. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040.
13. See Swann, supra note 9, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/section1.html.
14. Shirley Amendment, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416 (1912).  Congress enacted this
amendment after the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Division did not have
the authority to seize a product that falsely claimed it could treat cancer.  See Swann, supra note
9, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/section2.html.
15. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Backgrounder: Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug
Law History (Aug. 2005), at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html [hereinafter
FDA Backgrounder].  The FDA was transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the
Federal Security Agency, the predecessor to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
and later to the Department of Health and Human Services.  Id.
16. See Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir
Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER, June 1981, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/
history/elixir.html.
17.  See Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 456, 458 (1995), available at http://www.
annals.org/cgi/content/full/122/6/456.
drugs to take, as relatively few doctors existed at the time to recommend
medications.
The federal government began its effort to standardize drug monitoring and
analytical research in 1902, when the Chief Chemist of the Department of
Agriculture’s Bureau of Chemistry formed the Drug Laboratory; it was a one-
man operation with half a desk.11  A few years later, Congress passed the Pure
Food and Drugs Act of 1906,12 which laid the foundation for modern food and
drug law by prohibiting the distribution of mislabeled or adulterated drugs and
food in interstate commerce.13  In 1912, Congress strengthened the law by
prohibiting false and fraudulent claims of therapeutic value,14 and in 1930, it
formed the Federal Food and Drug Administration as part of the Bureau of
Chemistry.15
In 1937, a public health disaster provided the impetus for a tidal shift in
federal drug oversight.16  A well-established pharmaceutical company,
Massengill, began selling Elixir Sulfanilamide as treatment for diseases,
including strep throat and gonorrhea.17  The product, which was previously
sold as a tablet or in powder form, was manufactured in liquid form in order
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/1
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18. See Ballentine, supra note 16.
19. See id. (noting that Harold Cole Watkins, the chemist responsible for developing the
drug, committed suicide); FDA Backgrounder, supra note 15.
20. Ballentine, supra note 16.
21. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399
(2000)).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 355.  The 1938 law, while requiring manufacturers to prove the safety of
a drug to the FDA before marketing, did not require an evaluation of its effectiveness.
23. See id. (stating that a drug would be considered misbranded if its label was “false or
misleading in any particular”).
24. See Michael I. Krauss, Loosening the FDA’s Drug Certification Monopoly:
Implications for Tort Law and Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 461 (1996)
(stating that the Act included a provision that allowed for discretionary exemptions from
labeling requirements, which the FDA interpreted as providing it with the authority to create
“a category of ‘ethical drugs’ that could henceforth be sold only by prescription”).  In 1951, the
Durham-Humphrey Amendment clarified the legal distinction between prescription and
nonprescription drugs.  Ch. 578, §§ 1-2, 65 Stat. 648, 648-49 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 333, 353 (2000)).
25. PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 13 (2d ed. 1991) (observing the role of the FDA in preventing the outbreak of
thalidomide side effects that occurred in Europe from occurring in the United Sates); see also
Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing
Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 301-03 (2001) (stating that the 1962 Act changed
to satisfy popular demand by using diethylene glycol as a medium.18
Massengill did not realize that diethylene glycol was a deadly chemical known
today as antifreeze. The drug killed 107 people — mostly children — before
the product was recalled.19  Because Massengill was not required by the 1906
law to test the safety of the product before marketing it, the FDA could only
prosecute the tragedy as a case of mislabeling, as Massengill advertised the
drug as an elixir, even though it contained no alcohol.20
Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of
1938 to require a manufacturer of a “new drug” to test the product and notify
the FDA before bringing the new drug to market.21  This law, for the first time,
required companies to prove the safety of new drugs before placing them into
interstate commerce.22  The FDCA also established the requirement of
adequate labeling23 and began distinguishing between products that required
a physician’s prescription and those that could be adequately labeled for self-
medication.24
In 1962, a public health tragedy involving thalidomide, a treatment for
morning sickness that resulted in stillbirths and birth defects, led Congress to
“fundamentally restructure[] the way in which the FDA regulated new
medicines, transforming a system of premarket notification into one that
requires individual premarket approval of the safety and effectiveness of every
new drug.”25  Specifically, the 1962 Act gave the FDA responsibility for
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
140 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:135
the system from pre-market notification to pre-market approval, which effectively “transformed
the FDA’s role from a reviewer of data to an active participant in the drug development
process”).
26. See Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321-399 (2000)).  The FDA had delayed approval of the New Drug Application
for thalidomide, but FDA officials had not suspected the drug could cause birth defects.  See
FDAReview.org, The Independent Institute, History of Federal Regulation: 1902-Present, at
http://www.fdareview.org/history (last visited June 25, 2005).  The drug, however, was sold in
forty-six other countries prior to discovery of its impact, resulting in thousands of newborns
with physical deformities.  Id.
27. See Arthur H. Hayes, Jr., Food and Drug Regulation After 75 Years, 246 JAMA 1223,
1224 (1981) (noting that oversight of drug advertising was previously undertaken by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC)).
28. Id.
29. Richard A. Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug Administration,
45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994 (1977), reprinted in HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 25, at 20.
30.  See John Henkel, User Fees to Fund Faster Reviews, FDA CONSUMER SPECIAL ISSUE,
Jan. 1995, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/userfees.html.
31. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 379g, 379h (2000)).
32. In reauthorizing the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1997, Congress found that the
Act “substantially reduc[ed] review times . . . .”  Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997,
§ 101, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, 2298 (1997).  Congress once again reauthorized the
Act in 2002.  See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002,
tit. V, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594.
33. See Daniel Carpenter & A. Mark Fendrick, Accelerating Approval Times for New
Drugs in the U.S., 15 REG. AFF. J. 411, 412 (2004) (on file with author) (finding that the number
regulating clinical testing of new drugs, inspecting drug manufacturing
facilities, promulgating good manufacturing practices,26 and requiring
manufacturers to report adverse reactions to approved drugs.27  The FDA also
was given oversight responsibilities for prescription drug advertising.28  In
short, the FDA had gained full responsibility for prescribing “the standards of
safety and, in some instances, the standards of performance particular products
must meet before they reach the public.”29
Since the 1960s, this framework has remained in place, with Congress
making regular improvements as warranted.  For example, in response to
complaints from patients, doctors, and pharmaceutical companies that the FDA
drug approval process was taking too long,30 Congress enacted the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act in 1992, which required manufacturers to pay user fees to
the Agency for the evaluation of new drugs.31  This fee enabled the FDA to
hire more reviewers and decreased the wait time for the public to benefit from
safe and effective drugs.32  In fact, the staff at the Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (CDER) increased by over fifty percent between 1980 and
2000.33
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of CDER employees increased from approximately 1100 in 1980 to 1700 in 2000).
34. Bert W. Rein et al., Addressing the Conflict: FDA vs. Torts, PHARM. & MED. DEVICE
L. BULL., May 2003, at 1, 1, available at http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/pub/ljn_pharm/
3_5/news/141453-1.html (paid access only).
35.  “A principal focus of the Food and Drug Administration, apart from safety, is efficacy.
Since every drug includes some risks, the Food and Drug Administration regards efficacy as
essential — if one is to take risks, he or she should obtain the desired result.”  Victor E.
Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment
K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1985) [hereinafter Schwartz, Comment K].
36. Jan Elicker, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., An FDA Overview: Protecting Consumers,
Protecting Public Health (Aug. 2004), at http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fda101/fda101text.
html.
37. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN: PROTECTING AND ADVANCING
AMERICA’S HEALTH 9 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/mcclellan/FDAStrategicPlan.
pdf [hereinafter FDA STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN].
38. See Elicker, supra note 36.  The agency also has signed cooperative arrangements with
many state governments to increase the number of facilities that are checked.  Id.
39. See Hamilton, supra note 11.
40. See Carpenter & Fendrick, supra note 33, at 412.
41. See generally 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (2005).
The FDA today “administers the most comprehensive drug regulatory
system in the world.”34  Its mission is to optimize the risk-benefit tradeoff by
only allowing drugs on the market if they are reasonably safe for their intended
class of consumers and setting marketing and warning requirements that
companies must adhere to in order to sell their products.35  With a workforce
of 9000 people,36 the Agency regulates more than 150,000 drugs and medical
devices.37  It also conducts more than 16,000 visits per year to facilities that
handle FDA-regulated products in order to inspect manufacturers, to review
shipments of imported products, and to examine product samples for signs of
contamination.38  CDER, which began as a one-man operation 100 years ago,39
now employs over 1700 medical doctors, toxicologists, pharmacologists,
epidemiologists, chemists, and statisticians.40
B. The New Drug Approval Process
The New Drug Application (NDA), the hallmark of the FDA approval
process, subjects all prescription drug applications to rigorous formal rule-
making review.  The NDA enables the FDA to balance carefully the risks and
benefits of each prescription drug, to understand the inherent risks, and to
determine how to craft warnings for allowing each drug to be used safely and
effectively.41  Where a drug needs to be particularly strong, such as with
psychological issues leading to depression, schizophrenia or bi-polar disorder,
the FDA may be more tolerant of potentially dangerous side effects, because
without those drugs, patients may pose a significant threat to themselves and
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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42. For example, side effects for prescription drugs that may be prescribed for
schizophrenia include Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, Tardive Dyskinesia, Diabetes Mellitus,
and other potentially severe side effects.  See PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2609 (59th ed.
2005) (discussing contraindications, warnings and precautions for Geodon); id. at 1742 (for
Risperdal); id. at 662 (for Seroquel); id. at 1899 (for Zyprexa).
43. 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c).  “In fulfilling its mission to monitor and control the safety and
efficacy of drugs, the Agency continually walks a razor’s edge between two opposing risks —
premature approval of dangerous drugs and undue delay in making safe, effective, and
medically useful drugs available to the public.”  Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access
to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug
Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 96 (1999) (citations omitted).
44. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE
CDER HANDBOOK 7 (Mar. 16, 1998), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/ [hereinafter CDER
HANDBOOK].  Generic drugs can use the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) if it can
be based on the pioneer or “listed” drug’s approval.  21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (West 1999 & Supp.
2005).  The generic must be the “bioequivalent” of the pioneer drug, have the same active
ingredient, route of administration and dosage, and safe inactive ingredients.  Id. §§
355(j)(4)(c), (D), (H).
45. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23.  Animal testing is done to determine a drug’s potential effect
in human beings by using the drug’s reaction in animals to identify the chemical compounds
at work and assess the toxicity of the drug.  See id.
46. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20, 312.21; see also Charles J. Walsh
& Alyssa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices:
Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 905-07 (1996)
(discussing the three phases of human trials).
others.42  For a drug to be approved, the FDA must determine “that the drug
meets the statutory standards for safety and effectiveness, manufacturing and
controls, and labeling . . . .”43
1. Drug Design
A drug manufacturer starts the approval process by submitting an
“Investigational New Drug” (IND) application to the FDA.44  The FDA uses
its considerable scientific expertise to review the application and the drug
manufacturer’s animal testing of the proposed drug during preclinical
research.45  Only after the FDA approves the IND can a company use the drug
in tightly controlled tests with real patients, who agree to participate in the
experimental drug program, for gathering data on the drug’s clinical safety and
efficacy.46  Upon conclusion of those tests, the manufacturer files a New Drug
Application (NDA), detailing the chemistry of the drug, clinical data and
patient information, its use in children, reports of adverse reactions, and
proposed packaging and labeling, as well as any other pertinent manufacturing
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/1
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47. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50 (providing the required content and
format of an NDA), 314.55 (requiring assessment of safety and effectiveness in pediatric
subpopulations); see also CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 21.
48. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah 1991) (detailing the FDA NDA
process).
49. See CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 22-23.
50. See id. at 23-25.  During this process, the manufacturer may submit additional
information, as amendments, such as new analysis of previously submitted data or further study
to address questions raised during the FDA review.  21 C.F.R. § 314.60; CDER HANDBOOK,
supra note 44, at 25.  FDA investigators may inspect the manufacturer’s facilities to verify the
accuracy of the practices detailed in the application, to review manufacturing safeguards, and
to collect samples for testing.  CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 27-28; see also 21 C.F.R.
pts. 210, 211 (2005) (providing good manufacturing practices for manufacturing, processing,
packing, or holding of drugs).
51. See CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 25.
52. W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic
Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1440
(1994) [hereinafter Viscusi, Deterring Inefficient Litigation].  See generally 21 C.F.R. pt. 201
(2005) (stating the substantive and stylistics requirements for labels, including that labels and
warnings have proper prominence, typeface, and text size).
53. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.1, 201.10, 201.17, 201.50, 201.51.
54. See id. §§ 201.5, 201.55, 201.57.
information.47  An NDA often spans thousands of pages and describes the
impact of the drug in several hundred to several thousand patients.48
The CDER’s medical officers review the results of the human testing and
determine whether the amount of data provided by the manufacturer is
sufficient to extrapolate the scientific findings of the test sample to the general
population.49  They can order additional testing or seek the expertise of
independent advisory committees.50  Ultimately, this medical team must
approve the prescription drug as being safe and effective for public use.51
2. Warnings and Labels
To comply with FDA regulations, warnings must “portray the drug’s safety
profile with accuracy, balance, and brevity” to help physicians prescribe drugs
in ways that maximize a drug’s effectiveness and minimize its risks.52  The
label must include basic information, such as a description of the drug, identity
of its manufacturer, statement of ingredients, and an expiration date.53  The
label must provide directions for its intended use in the treatment, prevention,
or diagnosis of a disease or condition; this information includes any necessary
preparation, dosage (recommended, usual, and maximum dosage), and
frequency and duration of use.54  A label also must include a description of any
“situations in which the drug should not be used because the risk of use clearly
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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55. See id. § 201.57(d).
56. See id.
57. Id. § 201.57(d)-(f).
58. Id. § 201.57(g)-(I).
59. Id. § 201.58.
60. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 25.  Statutorily, the FDA must approve or reject
a New Drug Application (NDA) within 180 days of filing.  21 U.S.C.A. § 355(c)(1) (West 1999
& Supp. 2005); 21 C.F.R. § 314.100(a).  In practice, the time frame is much longer because the
FDA does not consider an application “filed” until it includes all the required information.
Overall, the NDA approval process usually takes one-and-one-half to two years.  See Ctr. for
Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Description of Line Chart: New Drug
Application Rates for NDAs Received in FY 1993-2002 and Approved Within 36 Months (Apr.
15, 2003), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/present/MedianAPtime/LifeTables/DescLifeTableN2agg
9302.htm.  Products that treat life-threatening conditions may be eligible for accelerated
approval.  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.500.
61. See Lester M. Crawford, Acting Commissioner of the FDA, Speech Before the Mayo
Alliance for Clinical Trials Conference (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/
speeches/2004/mayo0826.html.  According to the FDA, the eight percent approval rate is a
historic low for the product approvals.  Id.
62. See FDA STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN, supra note 37, at 10.  The price of developing and
bringing a new drug to market has increased rapidly over the past decade.  Id. (noting that the
cost has more than doubled over the past decade); see also Henry I. Miller, Failed FDA Reform,
outweighs any possible benefit.”55  This may include precautionary
information regarding any special care needed for the safe and effective use of
the drug, such as its use during pregnancy or by children.56
Finally, a label must include information on potential side effects, which the
FDA breaks down into three categories: (1) “contraindications,” where taking
the drug would place a patient under severe risk and the patient should be
discouraged from taking the drug; (2) “warnings,” which are serious risks
known to occur in some patients; and (3) “precautions,” which are risks that
arise less frequently.57  The manufacturer also must include on the label the
steps that should be taken in the event of an adverse reaction, the potential for
dependency or abuse, the signs and symptoms of an overdose, and the means
of treatment.58  Unless the FDA grants a specific waiver, the manufacturer
must include every element of the extensive disclosures in its labeling.59
3. Final FDA Approval
The NDA process is complete only when the Division or Office Director
signs an approval action letter allowing the manufacturer to market the drug
in the United States.60  Only eight percent of prospective products submitted
to the Agency receive approval and enter the marketplace.61  The average
process for bringing a drug to market takes more than a decade and $800
million.62
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REGULATION, Summer 1998, at 24, 24 (attributing an increase in cost for new drug development
and approval from $359 million to $500 million — in pretax 1990 dollars — between 1990 and
1993, and an increase in the time for approval from 8.1 years to 15.2 years since the 1960s to
the “FDA’s regulatory zeal”).
63. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 314.81.
64. See id. § 314.81(b)(2)(vi)(a) (requiring "[p]ublished clinical trials of the drug (or
abstracts of them), including clinical trials on safety and effectiveness; clinical trials on new
uses; biopharmaceutic, pharmacokinetic, and clinical pharmacology studies; and reports of
clinical experience pertinent to safety (for example, epidemiologic studies or analyses of
experience in a monitored series of patients) conducted by or otherwise obtained by the
applicant") (emphasis added).
65. See id. § 314.81.
66. See id. § 314.80(b).
67. See id. § 314.80(b), (c).
68. See id. § 314.80(b).
69. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (2000).
70. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION: FY 2003 ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE PLAN 2.3.1 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/ope/fy04plan/2004pp-
drugs.html; Elicker, supra note 36, at slide 18.
C. After-Market Responsibilities
The FDA conducts extensive post-market surveillance to assess whether a
drug’s real-time safety and efficacy results remain consistent with the risk-
balancing decisions made during the NDA process.63
This information often comes from epidemiological studies conducted by
drug manufacturers, the government, or other entities.64  These studies examine
whether those who take the drug experience previously unknown side effects
or whether the instructions for dosage and duration should be amended to
achieve the optimal risk-benefit trade-off.65  In addition, drug companies must
report all adverse drug reactions, regardless of whether the company or
attending physician believes the adverse illness is related to the drug.66
Manufacturers also must submit reports on actions taken in response to such
adverse drug reactions, as well as any new developments in scientific
knowledge on the drug.67  This responsibility includes the submission of data
from post-marketing reports, studies included in scientific literature, and
experiences with the drug in other countries.68  The FDA can enforce these
reporting requirements through civil and criminal penalties.69
Currently, the FDA monitors more than 10,000 drugs on the market and
receives more than 400,000 problem reports a year.70  Should after-market
results indicate that the risk-benefit analysis of the design or warnings are no
longer appropriate, the FDA can send warnings to physicians or other health
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71. See 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 (2005) (“[T]he Food and Drug Administration occasionally [is]
required to mail important information about drugs to physicians and others responsible for
patient care.”); id. § 201.200(a)(2) (“The Food and Drug Administration is . . . initiating
administrative actions as necessary to require product and labeling changes.”); 21 C.F.R. §
7.45(a) (2005) (“[t]he Commissioner of Food and Drugs or designee may request a firm to
initiate a recall”); 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (providing withdrawal authority).
72. Lisa Richwine, FDA to Create New Drug Safety Board, REUTERS, Feb. 15, 2005,
available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2005/02/15/fda_to_create_independent_
safety_board.
73. See id.; Merck & Co., Inc., Patient Product Information, at http://www.vioxx.com/
rofecoxib/vioxx/documents/english/vioxx_ppi.pdf (Aug. 2004) (explaining that VIOXX is used
to relieve arthritis pain); Marc Kaufman, FDA Panel Opens Door for Return of Vioxx, WASH.
POST, Feb. 19, 2005, at A1 (noting that VIOXX was designed to avoid gastrointestinal problems
that were sometime caused by older painkillers).
74. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Announces Voluntary Worldwide Withdrawal
of VIOXX® 1 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.vioxx.com/vioxx/documents/english/
vioxx_press_release.pdf.
75. See Marc Kaufman, FDA Panel Opens Door for Return of VIOXX, WASH. POST, Feb.
19, 2005, at A20 (reporting that the thirty-two-member commission banned direct-to-consumer
advertising for VIOXX and other COX-2 drugs and required a highlighted black box warning
on the bottle label on the risks of heart attacks and strokes).
76. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 108th
Cong. (Sept. 23, 2004) (statement of Dr. Robert Temple, Director, Office of Medical Policy,
Food and Drug Admin.), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/antidepressant0923.html
(“Suicidality, in the context of treating patients with depression and other psychiatric illnesses,
has been a genuine concern and a longstanding topic of debate.  Whether anti-depressant drug
use causes suicidal thinking or behavior in adult or pediatric patients is a critically important
question that we must answer in a careful, thoughtful manner.”).
practitioners, require labeling changes, ask the manufacturer  to recall a drug,
or withdraw the drug’s approval altogether.71
In late 2004, “[c]riticism of how the FDA monitors after-market drug
safety” grew, and the FDA changed its procedures to allow for even tighter
controls.72  The spark was Merck’s withdrawal of VIOXX, a COX-2 Inhibitor
that helped mitigate pain from arthritis and minimize the potential for stomach
bleeding, which is a common side effect of some other arthritis medications.73
Studies of after-market results showed that VIOXX taken daily for more than
eighteen months could lead to increased risk of heart attack and stroke.74  After
studying these and other scientific data, an FDA expert advisory panel
ultimately voted to allow VIOXX to be marketed in the United States with
certain restrictions and heightened warnings.75  In addition, there was increased
concern about the effect of certain antidepressants on children, as a number of
children who had taken these drugs had committed suicide.76
Congress held hearings on both of these issues, and the FDA responded by
creating a new independent Drug Safety Oversight Board (Board) to monitor
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77. Leavitt: Reforms Will Improve Oversight and Openness at FDA, FDA CONSUMER,
May-June 2005 [hereinafter Leavitt: Reforms] (quoting Secretary of Health and Human Services
Michael Leavitt as saying “The public has spoken and they want more oversight and
openness . . . . They want to know what we know, what we do with the information, and why
we do it.  We will address their concerns by cultivating openness and enhanced
independence.”), available at http://www. fda.gov/fdac/features/2005/305_drug.html.
78. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Fact Sheet: FDA Improvements in Drug Safety
Monitoring (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/factsheets/drugsafety.html.
79. Leavitt: Reforms, supra note 77 (stating that the Board will post information on the
FDA’s website, send regular updates for healthcare professionals, and boil down information
for consumer comprehension).
80. Id.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 402A cmt. k.
82. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, §6 cmt. b (“The traditional refusal by courts
to impose tort liability for defective designs of prescription drugs and medical devices is based
on the fact that a prescription drug or medical device entails a unique set of risks and benefits.
. . . This deference also rests on [the assumption that] governmental regulatory agencies
adequately review new prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous designs
off the market.”).
the drug safety of drugs already in the marketplace.77  The Board is comprised
of medical experts from the FDA, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and other federal agencies, including the Department of Veterans
Affairs.78  The Board also consults with outside medical, patient, and consumer
groups.  The Board works to educate key audiences about “emerging
information for both previously and newly approved drugs about possible
serious side effects or other safety risks that have the potential to alter the
benefit-risk analysis of a drug, affect patient selection or monitoring decisions,
or that can be avoided through measures taken to prevent or mitigate harm.”79
The Board also has the authority to help resolve disagreements over drug
safety issues and oversee the development of CDER’s drug safety policies.80
III. The Development of Prescription Drug Liability
As with the FDA’s regulatory structure, the body of tort law that has
developed regarding the manufacture and sale of prescription drugs recognizes
that harmful side effects are bound to occur because prescription drugs are
“unavoidably unsafe.”81  The law also recognizes that, because the FDA uses
exacting regulations to tightly manage the public risks associated with these
products, the approach for prescription drug liability differs from that of other
products.82
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83. The first case adopting strict liability was in 1944.  See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).  The doctrine became more widely accepted with Judge
Traynor’s decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., in which he wrote that a
“manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being.”  377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 402A.
85. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 402A.
A careful examination of the Appendix to Section 402A of the Restatement and
discussions by the eminent Professor John W. Wade, who later became the
reporter for the Restatement itself, show that all of the cases that were considered
involved mismanufactured products — contaminated food products or products
with construction defects.  These were cases where products contained foreign
objects, were missing important parts, or were not assembled in accordance with
the manufacturer’s own design plans.
Schwartz, Comment K, supra note 35, at 1139 (citations omitted).
86. Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 402A(2)(a) (stating that the rule applies
even though “the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product”).
88. See, e.g., Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
89. See generally John W. Wade, On Product “Design Defects” and Their Actionability,
A. The Law Has Treated Prescription Drug Liability Differently from
Liability Stemming from Other Products
In the 1960s, strict products liability emerged for mismanufactured products
of all kinds.83  Under strict liability, as formalized in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965, courts held product manufacturers
liable for injuries caused by defective products even if “all possible care” had
been exercised in making, marketing, and selling those products.84  The law
focused solely on the product, assessing whether there was a manufacturing
defect, namely that a product was not made in accordance with the
manufacturer’s own standards.85  The classic example of a manufacturing
defect is the case where a consumer opened a bottle of soda and found mouse
droppings and a decomposed mouse that, according to the court’s findings,
were in the bottle before liquid was added during the manufacturing process.86
If such a manufacturing defect were to cause harm, the plaintiff could sue
under strict liability and would not have to satisfy the requirements of
traditional negligence or warranty actions.  Liability would attach even if the
manufacturer had acted reasonably in making the product.87  Gradually, “strict
liability” extended beyond manufacturing cases to claims brought on the basis
of failure to warn or defective design.88  Courts initially struggled with
applying strict liability in these types of cases.89
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33 VAND. L. REV. 551 (1980) [hereinafter Wade, “Design Defects”].
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 402A cmt. k.  Dean Prosser, reporter for the
Restatement (Second), chose to handle prescription drug liability in a comment rather than a
separate section.  See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 1988).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 402A cmt. k.
92. Id. (“It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.”).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Schwartz, Comment K, supra note 35, at 1141.
96. See generally id.
97. Express warranty is “based on the fact that the defendant made a specific representation
about a product’s safety; plaintiff relied on that representation, and it turned out to be untrue.”
Victor E. Schwartz, Violation of Express Warranty: A Useful Tort that Must Be Kept Within
Rational Boundaries, 3 PRODS. LIAB. L.J. 147, 148 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Express
Warranty].
The Restatement (Second), in comment k of section 402A, avoids confusion
for design and failure to warn defects with respect to prescription drugs.
Comment k states that it would be unfair to apply strict liability to design
defects “in the field of drugs” because vaccines and prescription drugs are
“incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.”90  For
example, as the Restatement (Second) observes, the Pasteur treatment of rabies
can lead to serious and damaging side effects: “[s]ince the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve.”91  
The Restatement (Second) applies this premise to all prescription drugs.92
It states that while these products are “[u]navoidably unsafe,” when
“accompanied by proper directions and warning,” they are not “unreasonably
dangerous.”93  In so doing, the Restatement (Second) offers a fault-based
liability system for design defects for prescription drugs and vaccines.94  If a
drug manufacturer meets a reasonable standard of care for both design and
labeling, the product is not defective.95  Consequently, if a person experiences
a side effect caused by such a non-defective drug, that person will have a claim
against the manufacturer only if the manufacturer violated some other liability
theory,96 namely negligence, fraud, or express warranty.97
B. Judicial Reaction to Comment k
Courts have overwhelmingly agreed with the premise of comment k, that
is, that the “unreasonably dangerous” test and not strict liability should be
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98. “Comment k has been adopted in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have
considered the matter.”  Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 476 (Cal. 1988) (citing
DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983); Basko v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1969); Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Lab., 447 So. 2d
1301, 1303-04 (Ala. 1984); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 338-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978);
Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (D. Md. 1975); Johnson v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Kan. 1986)).  “We are aware of only one decision that has
applied the doctrine of strict liability to prescription drugs.”  Id. (citing Brochu v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-57 (1st Cir. 1981)).
99. Compare Brown, 751 P.2d at 470, with Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho
1987).
100. See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 481-83; Toner, 732 P.2d at 303-09.
101. 751 P.2d 470.
102. Id. at 476.
103. See id. at 473.
104. Id. at 477.
105. Id. at 480.
applied to design defects for unavoidably unsafe prescription drugs.98  By the
late 1980s, however, there was a split among courts as to how the fault-based
standard in comment k should be applied to prescription drugs.99  The courts
debated whether comment k should apply to all prescription drugs and whether
the same rules applied for both foreseeable and unforeseeable risks.100
A number of state high courts, such as the California Supreme Court in
Brown v. Superior Court,101 held that all prescription drugs were unavoidably
unsafe regardless of whether the risks were foreseeable, as in the case of the
rabies vaccine, or unforeseeable, as was, and has been the case, with a number
of modern prescription medicines.102  In Brown, plaintiffs brought claims
against numerous drug manufacturers alleging that their product,
diethylstilbestrol (DES), injured them in utero when their mothers took DES
to prevent miscarriages.103  The California high court concluded that “a drug
manufacturer’s liability for a defectively designed drug should not be
measured by the standards of strict liability,” and that “because of the public
interest in the development, availability, and reasonable price of drugs, the
appropriate test for determining responsibility is the test stated in comment
k.”104  Under the court’s comment k analysis, it held that the manufacturers
“neither knew nor could have known by the application of scientific
knowledge available at the time of distribution that the drug could produce the
undesirable side effects suffered by the plaintiff.”105  In issuing its holding, the
court applied a fault-based standard to all prescription drugs regardless of the
foreseeability of risks.
Several other courts, while agreeing that unavoidably unsafe products
should not be treated under a theory of strict liability, held that whether a
specific drug was unavoidably dangerous and, therefore, not appropriate for
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106. 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987).  For more recent cases on this point, see Bryant v.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000).
107. Toner, 732 P.2d at 299.
108. Id. at 300.
109. Id. at 305.
110. Id. at 308-09.
111. Id. at 306.
112. Id. at 308-09.
113. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481, 482 (Cal. 1988) (citing Kearl v.
Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).(expressing concern that because this
process relies on the subjective opinion of individual jurists, judges in various parts of the
country could arrive at different conclusions).
114. Id. at 481.
115. 686 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. La. 1988).
strict liability, should be made on a case-by-case basis by the presiding trial
judge.  For instance, in Toner v. Lederle Laboratories106 a three-month old boy
was vaccinated against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccine) and
subsequently became permanently paralyzed from the waist down.107  That
particular vaccine was the only licensed immunization available for pertussis,
despite the fact that it came with a risk of paralysis.108  In deciding how to
apply comment k to this case, the court said that comment k did not abolish
strict liability for all prescription drugs, just those where the seller could
“establish that the product’s risk is in fact ‘unavoidable.’”109  The court would
conduct “a full evidentiary hearing” on a case-by-case basis to recalculate the
risk balancing for each drug.110  The defense would have to show that there
was “no feasible alternative design that, on balance, accomplishes the subject
product’s purpose with a lesser risk.”111  If a defendant could not meet that test,
a trial could commence to determine whether the side effect resulted from a
design or warning defect, thereby triggering strict products liability for design
and warning defects in some prescription drugs.112
Courts, such as the one in Brown, have rejected this approach, saying that
under a system of mini-trials, there would be no way to predict which standard
of liability would apply to a particular drug, as a court’s decision would rest
on whether a particular judge — not medical science — found a drug to be
defective in design, “exceptionally important,” or “highly desirable.”113  The
Brown court also expressed concern with allowing “the question of superiority
of one drug over another . . . to be decided . . . in reference to the plaintiff,
since the advantages of a drug cannot be isolated from the condition of a
particular plaintiff.”114  A federal court applying Louisiana law in Williams v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp.115 reached the same conclusion: “[r]ather than simply
permitting juries to apply, haphazardly and case-by-case, the risk-utility test
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116. Id. at 577 (applying Louisiana law).
117. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 6; Mark A. Dotson, Restatement Third and
Prescription Drug Liability: A Tough Pill to Swallow or Business as Usual?, 4 T.M. COOLEY
J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 29, 29 (2000); see also Parkinson v. Guidant Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 741
(W.D. Pa. 2004) (applying these principles to medical devices under Pennsylvania law).
118. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, THIRD: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, at xv, xvi (1998) (observing that the Restatement states where the law currently
stands and how it is changing).
119. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 6.
120. Restatement Third section 6(b)(1) refers back to section 2(a), which defines
manufacturing defect law for general product defects.  RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, §
6.
121. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 2.
122. Wade, “Design Defects,” supra note 89, at 551, 553.
123. See id. at 552 (“[I]t is not in regard to this element that a distinction is to be drawn
whenever harm results, the court must require, as a part of the plaintiff’s
burden of producing evidence, an articulable basis for disregarding the FDA’s
determination that the drug should be available.”116
IV. The Current Liability Regime for Prescription Drugs
In an effort to provide greater clarity to this debate and emphasize the
unique nature of prescription drug liability, the new Restatement of Torts,
Third: Products Liability, adopted in 1997, offered a distinct section solely on
the liability framework associated with product defects in prescription drugs
and medical devices.117  Private plaintiff and defense lawyers collaborated with
academics and judges to produce the Restatement Third.118  Section 6 focuses
solely on medical liability and sets forth when there can be a claim for a
manufacturing, design, or failure to warn defect.119 
A. Manufacturing Defect
The Restatement Third states that “a prescription drug or medical device is
defective if at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical
device . . . contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a),” the section
of the Restatement Third that defines manufacturing defect law for other
products.120  Consequently, a drug has a manufacturing defect “when the
product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was
exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product.”121  Because the
product is not in its “intended condition,” it is “defective in the normal sense
of the expression. . . . [A]ll that the plaintiff must do is show that the product
was in the dangerous condition when it left the defendant’s control.”122  The
manufacturer faces strict liability for injuries caused by the manufacturing
defect, even in the absence of negligence.123
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between negligence and strict liability.”).
124. “This limitation on the scope of comment k immunity is universally recognized.”
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991).
125. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J.
825, 826 (1973) [hereinafter Wade, Strict Tort Liability] (listing one of the prime reasons given
for embracing the strict liability approach as the deterrent effect: “Experience seems to
demonstrate that if a manufacturer knows he will be held liable for injuries inflicted by his
product, that product will be safer than if he understands that he can avoid liability by
demonstrating the exercise of due care.”).
126. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 2 cmt. a.
127. See id. § 6(c).
128. Id. § 6.
129. Id. § 2.  The Restatement Third does not view the expectations of the consumer as an
independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs, except with respect to
food and used products.  “Consumer expectations, standing alone, do not take into account
whether the proposed alternative design could be implemented at reasonable cost, or whether
an alternative design would provide greater overall safety.”  Id. § 2 cmt. g, at 27.  In addition,
the consumer is defined differently in the prescription drug market, as the medical and legal
No controversy exists over manufacturing defect law for prescription
drugs.124  As with other products, strict liability in the manufacturing of
prescription drugs creates appropriate incentives for companies to ensure good
quality control and that their products are made as intended.125  Thus, the
Restatement Third was faithful to the original purpose and scope of strict
products liability, namely applying it only to manufacturing defects.126
B. Design Defect
With regard to design defect, the Restatement Third states that 
[a] prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due
to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its
foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable [healthcare]
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic
benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any
class of patients.127
1. Strict Liability Is Not Appropriate for All Prescription Drugs
As the Restatement Third observes, design defect liability for all
prescription drugs fundamentally differs from other products.128  Under
traditional products liability law, as set forth in section 2(b) of the Restatement
Third, a product manufacturer faces liability for a design defect when the
“foreseeable risks of harm” could have been “reduced or avoided” through a
“reasonable alternative design.”129  Any such risk-utility balancing of a
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community uniformly considers the doctor, not the patient, to be the consumer of prescription
drugs.  See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988).
130. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 2 cmt. d.
131. See generally 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (2005).
132. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991).
133. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 6 cmt. b.
134. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 478 (“[T]here is no possibility for an alternative design for a
drug like DES, which is a scientific constant compounded in accordance with a required
formula.”).
135. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 6 cmt. f.
136. See id. § 6(c).
137. This concept tracks with traditional products liability law, which allows a court to
determine that a product, with no reasonable alternative design is defective because it simply
is not reasonably safe.  The Restatement Third defines such products as those where “the
extremely high degree of danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its
negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts,
would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the product.”  Id. § 2 cmt. e, at 22.
product’s design by courts presumes that there are other ways to make a
product and compares the design in question to state-of-the-art knowledge and
industry practice.130
This comparison cannot be made for prescription drugs, as each drug is a
unique formulation that must be specifically approved by the FDA.131  For
example, COX-2 inhibitors, such as VIOXX and Celebrex, are each unique
products, not alternative designs of each other.  The standard also cannot be
assessed by the impact that a drug has on any particular individual.  Because
the chemical compounds in prescription drugs “interact with the chemical and
physiological processes of the human body, they will almost always pose some
risk of side effects in certain individuals.”132  So while a particular formulation
may be the saving grace for one patient, it may be harmful to another.133  For
these reasons, the“reasonable alternative design” standard should not define
whether a prescription drug has a design defect.134
2. Courts Should Apply “Reasonable” Medical and Research Standards
for the Design of Prescription Drugs
The Restatement Third replaces the reasonable alternative design standard
with a “reasonable health-care provider” standard.135  Under this standard, a
drug only has a design defect when no reasonable health provider,
knowledgeable in the risks and benefits of the drug, would prescribe the drug
to any patient.136  In these situations, the drug offers no net benefit to any class
of patients and the manufacturer faces strict liability for adverse reactions
caused by its drug.137  According to the Restatement Third, this standard is
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138. Id. § 6 cmt. f, at 149.  Because this is an objective standard, a court must determine
what a “reasonable” physician would do and cannot be swayed by the passionate testimony of
any one doctor that he or she would or would not prescribe the drug.  Id.
139. See id. § 6 cmt. g, at 150 (“Drug and medical device manufacturers have the
responsibility to perform reasonable testing prior to marketing a product and to discover risks
and risk-avoidance measures that such testing would reveal.”).
140. 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (2005).
141. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (2000) (stating that a drug requires a prescription
“because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the
collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a
practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug”).
142. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 6 cmt. g (“Courts have also recognized that
the regulatory system governing prescription drugs is a legitimate mechanism for setting the
standards for drug design.”); see also Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 89 (Utah 1991)
(finding that the FDA is “capable of and appropriate for making the preliminary determination
regarding whether a prescription drug’s benefits outweigh its risks”).
143. See Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 307 (Idaho 1987).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 288C cmt. a; see Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (1892) (pioneering the concept of minimum standards).
145. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
objective and “very demanding” to satisfy: “liability is likely to be imposed
only under unusual circumstances.”138
To meet its obligation under the “reasonable health-care provider” standard,
the Restatement Third states that a drug manufacturer must undertake
“reasonable research” to determine the risks and benefits of a drug before
taking it to market.139 This standard inherently recognizes that it is not possible
to uncover every potential side effect that a particular drug may cause.  The
FDA uses its formal rule-making process to review this research and determine
if more research is needed in order for an application to be complete.140  When
the drug’s chemical make-up provides inherent risks of side effects that are
unavoidable for some patients, the FDA requires the drug to be available only
through a doctor’s prescription.141  Thus, for the FDA’s approval process to
have any meaning, the requirements of the FDA’s NDA program must set the
legal standard for what constitutes “reasonable” research for each prescription
drug.142 
Allowing courts to second-guess FDA assessments in hindsight, as the
Toner court would have them do,143 ignores the unique nature of the FDA
regulatory process.  Other federal agencies, such as National Highway
Transportation Safety Agency or the Consumer Protection Safety Commission,
have been found by some courts to set “minimum” safety standards for
products.144  Manufacturers of products subject to these controls may be due
a rebuttable presumption when sued for conduct compliant with those
standards.145  The FDA, on the other hand, must specifically approve for
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146. See discussion supra Part II.B.
147. In a traditional regulatory compliance defense analysis, the key question is whether the
regulatory scheme establishes minimum standards or “an optimal cost-benefit balance struck
by the agency.”  2 REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 108; see also Grundberg, 813 P.2d at
89 (“The federal government has established an elaborate regulatory system, overseen by the
FDA, to control the approval and distribution of these drugs.  No other class of products is
subject to such special restrictions or protections in our society.”) (citation omitted).
148. “Under regulation innovators are likely to face a long, costly, and uncertain process of
screening and clearance before being allowed to deploy new products or processes. . . . In return
for paying the up-front ‘price’ of enduring the regulatory gauntlet, the enterprise obtains
reasonable investment security.”  2 REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 88.  Where regulations
do not govern pre-market activity, “the price for this freedom is continuing exposure to future
liabilities.”  Id.
149. For plaintiff rights decisions by the Supreme Court of Utah, consider the following
cases: Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004)
(defying the language and the spirit of the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States
on punitive damages in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell); Sun
Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989)
(holding that the architects and builders statute of repose violated the open courts provision of
the state constitution); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (holding that
the statute of repose barring product liability claims six years after the purchase or ten years
after the date of manufacture of a product violated the access to courts provision of the state
constitution).  For plaintiff rights decisions by the Supreme Court of Washington, consider the
following cases: DeYoung v. Providence Medical Center, 960 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1998) (holding
that the state’s eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d
711 (Wash. 1989) (holding that the variable limit on noneconomic damages awards violated the
right to trial by jury under the state constitution); Kirk v. Washington State University, 746 P.2d
285 (Wash. 1987) (permitting recovery for hedonic loss as a separate element of damages by
drawing technical distinctions between the concepts of pain and suffering, disability, and lost
enjoyment of life).
150. See Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59 (Wash. 1996); Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 89.
market each prescription drug and agree to all instructions and warnings with
regards to risks and side effects.146  Because of these tight controls, courts have
allowed regulatory agencies to determine that a specifically approved product
is not legally defective.147  With the FDA defining the standard of care that
drug manufacturers owe consumers, a manufacturer has a significant
incentive — the opportunity to protect itself from a design defect claim — to
meet every requirement and turn over all pertinent information, including all
adverse risk reports and background studies, to the FDA.148
For this and the other foregoing reasons, several courts, including the
Supreme Courts of Utah and Washington, both of which have been particularly
sensitive to the rights of plaintiffs,149 have applied the unavoidably dangerous
products doctrine to all prescription drugs for both foreseeable and
unforeseeable risks.150  As the Supreme Court of Utah concluded, “all
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151. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95.  A drug that is “properly prepared, compounded, packaged,
and distributed, cannot as a matter of law be ‘defective’ in the absence of proof of inaccurate,
incomplete, misleading, or fraudulent information furnished by the manufacturer in connection
with FDA approval.”  Id. at 90.
152. Young, 922 P.2d at 64.
153. See, e.g., Hackett v. G.D. Searle & Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (in
a case involving the prescription drug Celebrex, the federal district court, applying Texas law,
held that all prescription drugs are unavoidably dangerous and that a prescription drug
manufacturer can only be held strictly liable “if the drug was not properly prepared or marketed
or accompanied by proper warnings”); Doe v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 257, 267
(D. Me. 2004) (interpreting Maine law); Hahn v. Richter, 673 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1996)
(“[r]eaffirming that the basis of liability in [a prescription drug] case is the failure to exercise
reasonable care rather than strict liability . . . [in reliance] on the principles set forth in
comments j and k”); Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that the oral polio vaccine was unavoidably unsafe under comment k); Fellows v. USV Pharm.
Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D. Md. 1980) (suggesting that Maryland would likely follow the
approach of courts that have held that prescription drugs are not unreasonably dangerous and
manufacturers would only be liable if they failed to provide adequate warnings); Lindsay v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that “unavoidably unsafe”
prescription drugs are not defective or unreasonably dangerous if accompanied by directions
and warnings).
prescription drugs should be classified as unavoidably dangerous in design
because of their unique nature and value, the elaborate regulatory system
overseen by the FDA, the difficulties of relying on individual lawsuits as a
forum in which to review a prescription drug's design, and [for] significant
public policy considerations.”151  
The Supreme Court of Washington agreed: “a separate determination of
whether a product is unavoidably unsafe need not be made on a case-by-case
basis if that product is a prescription drug.”152  Other courts, appreciating the
sound public policy balancing of the Utah and Washington courts, have ruled
similarly.153
C. Defects Due to Failure to Warn
The Restatement Third defines failure to warn defect as follows: 
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or
warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other [healthcare] providers who are in a
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
instructions or warnings; or 
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154. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 6(d).
155. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 6; see also Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423
N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ohio 1981) (stating that, under comment j of the Restatement (Second), there
is “a presumption that an adequate warning, if given, will be read and heeded”).
156. In situations where doctors prescribe drugs for purposes that ignore warnings and go
beyond risks approved by the FDA, the doctors are responsible for harms that stem from new
and unapproved uses.  Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882, 887-88 (Minn. 1970).
Since Mulder, a majority of courts have allowed into evidence the information included in the
packaging.  Though not conclusive, such evidence aids in determining whether a physician
violated his standard of care to a patient.  Some courts have held that manufacturer-provided
information sets the standard of care for the physicians; other courts allow manufacturer-
provided information to be evidence of notice of certain potential side effects or the basis for
an expert opinion.  Glenn E. Bradford & Charles C. Elben, The Drug Package Insert and the
PDR as Establishing the Standard of Care in Prescription Drug Liability Cases, 57 J. MO. B.
233, 234, 238 (2001) (discussing case law relevant to suits against physicians for off-label use).
A manufacturer of prescription drugs would only be subject to liability for “off label” use of its
prescription drug if the company actively encouraged that “off label” use, as a manufacturer
must submit a supplemental new drug application and receive FDA approval to promote a new
use for an existing drug and to include that new use on the packaging.  59 Fed. Reg. 59,820
(Nov. 18, 1994).  If the label includes information about an unapproved use, the label would be
“misbranded,” subjecting the manufacturer to FDA enforcement actions.  See Wash. Legal
Found. v. Henny, 202 F.3d 331, 332-33 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 352(a)).
157. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 8, § 6.
158. See Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to
know the [healthcare] providers will not be in a position to reduce
the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.154
Thus, the Restatement Third applies a “reasonable” test, not strict liability,
to failure to warn defect law; the obligation of the manufacturer is to provide
adequate and reasonable warnings to the prescribing physician or other
similarly situated health provider so that they can prescribe the drug safely and
effectively.155  If such warnings are not adequate or not provided to the
physician, a manufacturer may be subject to liability for any injury caused by
the breach.156
1. Defining Adequate Warning
The Restatement Third defines adequate warning as “reasonable instructions
or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm.”157  This “reasonable”
standard allows the substance of the warnings to correspond with the potential
deficiencies discovered during the pre-market research into the drug’s design.
Thus, as with design defect, the only way to implement this liability structure
is for the FDA to determine which warnings are “reasonable” and
“foreseeable” for each prescription drug.158
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and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 233, 236 (1986) (stating that the FDA
“retains, as a practical matter, complete control over package inserts”); see also Richard
Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability for
Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 100 (2002) [hereinafter
Ausness, Aggressive Marketing Practices] (the FDA has authority over any information that
could reach a doctor or patient, including brochures, letters, and advertising).
159. Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 61-62 (Wash. 1996).
160. Id. at 64.
161. Id. at 62.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 64, 65 n.4.
164. Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 306-07 (Idaho 1987) (citations omitted).
165. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 486 n.4 (Cal. 1988).  In a failure to warn
case, to prove proximate causation, the plaintiff also would have to show that a different
warning would have prevented the alleged injury.  See, e.g., Dyson v. Winfield, 113 F. Supp.
2d 35, 41 (D.D.C. 2000) (whether or not the warning is defective, plaintiff still must show that
the doctor would have changed the prescription).
166. Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 1.21 (2005) (stating the requirement for all material information to be
included on a label).
Courts are generally in agreement that this standard must be applied at the
time of marketing, not afterwards.  For example, the Supreme Court of
Washington heard a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed
to warn doctors about possible complications of a time-release asthma
medication for a three-year-old boy.159  A viral infection and fever elevated the
presence of the drug in his system, causing a seizure.160  The jury ruled for the
defense.161  On appeal, the court found that “the state of knowledge about the
relationship between fevers or viral illnesses and [the drug] was not yet
clinically reliable and that it would have been irresponsible for the drug
company to warn of risks that were not yet proven to be legitimate risks.”162
The court further recognized that “[e]ven where a drug . . . has been in use for
a number of decades, it is obviously impossible to know absolutely that every
risk attendant to its use is already known. . . . [I]t is precisely because they are
unavoidably unsafe to some degree that they are prescription drugs.”163 Even
the court in Toner agreed with this premise, stating, “[t]he weighing must be
done as of the time the product is distributed to the plaintiff.  Comment k does
not require sellers to be clairvoyant.”164
Therefore, a drug manufacturer can only warn of harms it knew or should
have known as a result of reasonable research at the time of marketing.165
Should after-market results indicate a need to modify warnings or instructions,
the company must seek approval from the FDA for the changes.  The new
wording must accurately reflect the best scientific evidence,166 not fear or
concern about a potential reaction, or a desire to avoid potential litigation. 
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167. See, e.g., Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1031-32 (D.N.J. 1988)
(“Once the physician has been warned, it is the physician’s duty to decide which drug to use and
to explain the risks involved.  Because prescription drugs are often complex in formula and
effect, the physician is in the best position to take into account the propensities of the drug and
the susceptibilities of the patient, and to give a highly individualized warning to the ultimate
user based on the physician’s specialized knowledge.”) (citations omitted)).
168. Id. at 1032.
169. See Ausness, Aggressive Marketing Practices, supra note 158, at 108; see also Doe v.
Solvay Pharm., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 257, 272 (D. Me. 2004) (stating that under Maine law,
there is “a presumption that if an adequate warning is given [to] the physician, it will be read
and heeded” by the physician).
170. See Bradford & Elben, supra note 156, at 233 (“The insert is directed to the physician
and is not customarily seen by the patient.”).
171. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477-78 (Cal. 1988) (“The manufacturer cannot
be held liable if it has provided appropriate warnings and the doctor fails in his duty to transmit
these warnings to the patient or if the patient relies on inaccurate information from others
regarding side effects of the drug.”).  With the advent of the Internet, the spread of inaccurate
information collected at various websites can lead to significant misinformation.  Drug
manufacturers also have a continuing duty to warn the medical community of “risks or side
effects that are discovered after the product is first marketed.”  Ausness, Aggressive Marketing
Practices, supra note 158, at 107-08.
172. See Foreword to the Fifty-Ninth Edition of PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE (59th ed.
2005).  In accordance with federal regulations, the Physicians’ Desk Reference includes
“indications, effects, dosages, routes, methods, and frequency and duration of administration,
and any relevant warnings, hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions” for each
drug.  Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(1) (2005)).
2. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine
The law treats the prescribing physician as the person legally responsible
for reading warnings and evaluating a patient’s medical condition to determine
if a particular drug would benefit a particular patient, given the drug’s inherent
risks.167  The physician is called the “learned intermediary.”168
Under this “learned intermediary” doctrine, the doctor, not the patient, takes
the role of primary decision-maker in determining whether a patient should
take a drug, and if so, which drug.169  Consequently, prescription drug
warnings and instructions are not meant for the consumer, but the physician,
who bears the responsibility of ensuring that the medication is not over-
prescribed and monitoring the patient’s reaction to the drug.170  The
manufacturer bears the responsibility of providing warnings, instructions, and
other relevant guidance information to the prescribing physician,171 which it
does through the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR), a reference guide
containing “exact” copies of the FDA approved labels of prescription drugs.172
The manufacturer also can convey these instructions and guidance materials
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173. See Bradford & Elben, supra note 156, at 234.  Pharmacists generally receive inserts
as part of bulk shipments.  They break down the bulk shipment to fill individual prescriptions.
Therefore, the information is not conveyed directly from the manufacturer to the patient at
either prescription or at delivery.  See Ausness, Aggressive Marketing Practices, supra note
158, at 109-10.
174. Ausness, Aggressive Marketing Practices, supra note 158, at 109.
175. See West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991) (finding that “it is virtually
impossible in many cases for a manufacturer to directly warn each patient”).
176. Id.
177. 778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001).
178. Id. at 832.
179. Id. at 833 (The package insert stated “ANSAID should not be given to patients in whom
ANSAID, aspirin or other [NSAIDs] induce asthma, urticaria, or other allergic-type reactions.
Fatal asthmatic reactions have been reported in such patients receiving this type of drug.”).  Id.
at 833-34.
180. Id. at 834.
181. Id. at 847.
directly to prescribing physicians and pharmacists, such as through direct mail
and package inserts.173
This structure is based on the fact that patients generally do not have the
training or are not properly situated to undertake the complex endeavor of
assessing medical risk-benefit analyses.174  First, given the anxiety that may
accompany the medical condition necessitating the prescription drug, patients
and their families are not likely to be in the proper mind set to make such
calculations.  Second, warnings are written in technical terms with broad
application.  It would be impractical for a drug company to distill the risk
analysis into lay language or to tailor the risk analysis to individual patients
and their unique medical conditions and histories.175  Third, imposing a duty
to warn patients directly “would interfere with the relationship between the
doctor and the patient.”176
In one recent case before the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Vitanza v.
Upjohn Co.,177 the court applied the learned intermediary doctrine to bar a
claim from a woman whose husband developed a fatal allergic reaction to her
nonsteriodal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID).178  The manufacturer knew its
product could cause fatal reactions in those allergic to aspirin or other NSAIDs
and included such a warning in its package insert and PDR listing, but not on
its sample packets.179  The husband, aware that he was allergic to NSAIDs and
not seeing a warning on the sample packet his wife received from her doctor,
took the NSAID; he died shortly thereafter from severe respiratory and cardiac
arrest.180  The court held that the manufacturer fulfilled its duty to inform the
physician.181  It also listed more than forty states or jurisdictions that have
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182. Id. at 838.
183. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding polio vaccine
manufacturer liable for failure to warn consumer of risks).
184. See Ausness, Aggressive Marketing Practices, supra note 158, at 111.
185. Hill v. Searle Labs., Inc., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989).  IUD cases are “atypical
from most prescription drug products because the treating physician generally does not make
an intervening, individualized medical judgment in the birth control decision.”  Id. at 1070.
186. See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 766 (Ky. 2004); Ausness, Aggressive
Marketing Practices, supra note 158, at 112.
187. See, e.g., Lennon ex rel. Lennon v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. 1793 EDA 2000,
2001 WL 755944, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 14, 2001) (holding that direct-to-consumer
advertising does not overcome the basic premise that the decision for a patient to take a drug
lies with the physician); Heindel v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-3348(SRC), 2004 WL 1398024,
at *17 (D.N.J. June 7, 2004) (applying Pennsylvania law and stating that the learned
intermediary “breaks the chain in terms of reliance, since the patient cannot obtain prescription
drugs without the physician no matter what they believe about them”).
188. Direct-to-consumer advertising by drug companies began in the 1980s, some ten years
before the Restatement Third was written and published.  See Ausness, Aggressive Marketing
Practices, supra note 158, at 98.  Advertisements that suggest a drug is suitable for a particular
condition must include a summary of the warning information.  They also tend to recommend
talking with a doctor, whose prescription is required in order to take the medication.  Therefore,
it is unquestionably the responsibility of the prescribing doctor, and not the sponsor of the
advertisement — as dictated by the learned intermediary rule — to ensure that the patients are
prescribed appropriate medication.  See id. at 99 (concluding that “subjecting pharmaceutical
companies to greater tort liability will not necessarily benefit the consuming public”).  But see
Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245, 1257 (N.J. 1999) (holding, in case involving
adopted the learned intermediary doctrine, saying that the “wealth of decisions
adopting the doctrine is highly persuasive.”182
Courts have found only a few instances where warnings need to be
communicated directly to the patient in order for the manufacturer to avoid
liability under failure to warn.  Thus far, in all of these situations the traditional
physician-patient relationships have broken down: vaccines administered by
clinics to the mass public,183 oral contraceptives,184 and, in one instance, intra-
uterine devices (IUDs).185  It should be noted that a majority of courts have
allowed the learned intermediary doctrine to apply to mass vaccinations and
IUDs when manufacturers fulfill their duty by warning the purchaser, such as
the Center for Disease Control, who the manufacturer either obligated or
reasonably relied on to warn the consumer.186
Importantly, the learned intermediary doctrine does not preclude the drug
manufacturer from educating consumers directly about its prescription drugs,
such as through direct-to-consumer advertising.187  These communications
with patients must include statements of risk consistent with the FDA
approved warnings and make clear that the potential consumer’s physician, not
the consumer, decides whether the patient will use the drug.188
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advertisements for contraception, that the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply to the
direct marketing of drugs to consumers).
189. See Amicus Brief of Food and Drug Administration for the United States in Support
of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 16, Motus v. Pfizer Inc. 358 F.3d 659 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), available at 2002 WL 32303084 [hereinafter FDA
Brief].
190. Pharmacists and physicians remain in control of patients’ drug choices:
V. The Public Policy Rationale for Complementary Regulatory and
Liability Regimes 
The liability system for prescription drugs recognized by the Restatements
and detailed in the previous Part places incentives in the right direction: drug
companies should meet the requirements of the FDA or face the threat of strict
liability.  A drug manufacturer acting outside of FDA authority or securing
FDA approval dishonorably, such as by not providing material information in
obtaining or maintaining FDA approval, should be subject to liability for
design and failure to warn defects.  
Conversely, if a drug manufacturer complies with FDA’s exacting
regulations, thereby acting reasonably in researching and marketing a drug, the
drug manufacturer should not be responsible in tort law under strict liability
if someone experiences a side effect.  While there may be an injury, there
would be no breach of an objective standard of care. In these instances, the
manufacturer only should be liable for injuries caused by an objective
wrongful act, such as specific acts of negligence, fraud, or breach of express
warranty conducted in connection with manufacturing, marketing, or selling
the prescription drug.  These specific acts would go beyond conduct in accord
with the normal FDA drug approval process.
In its basic form, this system assigns responsibility to pharmaceutical
companies and the FDA to make macro-level health care decisions about the
availability and use of prescription drugs, knowing that some people will
experience certain side effects.  Manufacturers would produce and market
prescription drugs that benefit some class of patients.  The FDA would oversee
this process in accordance with the procedures discussed earlier in the article,
assuring that drugs are developed under a reasonable standard of care and that
warnings are given of reasonably known side effects.  Such a system would
allow the FDA, through regulation and enforcement, to set an appropriate
national public risk strategy for each individual prescription drug.  The FDA
has welcomed this responsibility.189 
  Doctors bear the responsibility, then, to weigh the risks and benefits in
making the decision of whether a particular patient should take a particular
drug.190  Although a patient’s need for a particular medication may be certain,
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The entire system of drug distribution in America is set up so as to place the
responsibility of distribution and use upon professional people.  The laws and
regulations prevent prescription type drugs from being purchased by individuals
without the advice, guidance and consent of licensed physicians and pharmacists.
These professionals are in the best position to evaluate the warnings put out by the
drug industry.
Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
191. 2 REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 89.
192. Id. at 87.
193. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
194. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability, 6 YALE J. ON
REG. 65 (1989) [hereinafter Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role] (discussing how market forces,
regulation, litigation, and social insurance interact).
the drug may cause serious side effects, a situation that presents a choice for
the doctor and patient, or patient representative.  Neither the drug company nor
the FDA can make that decision; only the doctors and patients can determine
whether a particular drug is worth taking given the current ailment or situation
of the patient.  In fact, this very rationale supports the almost universally
accepted learned intermediary rule.
A. The Health Care Impact of Litigation for Approved Drugs and Warnings
Before issuing the new section for medical liability in the Restatement
Third, the Reporters’ Study examined the impact on America’s health care of
subjecting prescription drug manufacturers to strict liability under design and
warning defect law for designs and warnings that had been approved through
the extensive FDA regulatory process.191  The Reporters’ Study concluded that
such a dual system would threaten American health care with paying the price
of both systems without the benefit of either:
[I]f liability is retained for such risks, larger errors are likely to
occur in resolving through case by case litigation issues related to
the magnitude of the risk, product defects and warnings, and
causation. . . . Consequently, retention of tort liability threatens to
perpetuate some of the very problems that led to the creation of
regulatory programs to deal with such risks.192
As this passage indicates, regulation supplanted liability in managing the
safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs, because characteristics inherent
to the litigation process prevent it from competently managing public risk.  For
example, regulators use an open rule-making process to hear from all parties
and experts to make the best decision for the country.193  Courts use the rules
of evidence and only hear from parties and their partisan experts representing
narrow legal positions.194  Thus, where court decisions have the effect of
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195. “Judges and juries lack the specialized experience necessary for resolving the
intertwined, technical issues associated with assessing the risks and benefits of many industrial
products and processes.”  Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort
Liability: Limiting the Dual Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167, 2169 (2000); see also Rein, supra
note 34, at 3.
196. See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Ky. 2004) (stating that “the lay
consumer might overreact to such warnings and forego beneficial, or even vital, medical
treatment”).
197. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 195, at 2176 (stating that the tort system has a “record of
error in resolving scientifically and technically complex issues and . . . inherent limitations in
making appropriate risk-benefit tradeoffs”).
198. See id. at 2171.
199. This potential decrease has been described negatively:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products should
make good the harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add the cost to the
price of the product, encounters reason for pause, when we consider that two of
the greatest medical boons to the human race, penicillin and cortisone, both have
their dangerous side effects, and that drug companies might well have been
deterred from producing and selling them.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 661 (4th ed. 1971).  Experts
generally accept that liability impacts the availability of products.  For example, in responding
to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress enacted various liability protections
for manufacturers of products qualified as anti-terrorism technologies.  In provisions of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), which were
labeled the “SAFETY Act,” Congress barred punitive damages and prejudgment interest against
the makers of such technology, established a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer is
entitled to the government contract defense, and eliminated joint and several liability for non-
regulation, such as where a manufacturer is held liable for FDA compliant
behavior, the courts’ decision-making process is inadequate.  
Also, prescription drug litigation requires judges and jurors to consider
complicated legal, moral, and scientific topics in an emotionally charged
courtroom without the time or training to wrestle with the issues.195  Some
individuals in the legal decision-making process, therefore, may have an
understandably difficult time viewing design and warning decisions as
scientific calculations based on a careful balancing of risks and benefits.196
The consequences of bad courtroom decision-making, such as cases
involving Bendectin™, breast implants, and certain vaccines, are well-
documented.197  These drugs and devices were not the “cause” of the harms
alleged, yet the introduction of unsound scientific evidence on the issue of
causation subjected their manufacturers to significantly disproportionate
liability.198  In these instances, the drug manufacturers, as a practical matter,
had no choice but to pull their products off the market.  Other manufacturers
facing similar circumstances in the future may have to significantly increase
the price of their drugs in order to offset liability and liability-related costs.199
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economic damages, and other things.  See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 59,684 (Oct. 16, 2003)
(explaining the rationale for these liability protections).
200. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479-80 (Cal. 1988) (expressing concern
that any form of strict liability could force drug manufacturers to stop producing valuable,
ethical drugs — or at least delay their release — because of disproportionate liability costs or
inability to obtain reasonable insurance); Schwartz, Comment K, supra note 35, at 1141 (“The
basic message here is that, in general, ethical drugs and harms that arise out of their use should
not subject their manufacturer, distributor or retailer to strict liability.”); Viscusi, Deterring
Inefficient Litigation, supra note 52, at 1445, 1454 (It would be difficult to quantify the impact
that excessive liability could have on America’s health care because “the costs of drug
unavailability are often in the realm of the abstract.”).
201. See, e.g., Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984) (under such a
system, “a manufacturer would be required to inundate physicians indiscriminately with notice
of any and every hint of danger, thereby inevitably diluting the force of any specific warning”);
W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law,
48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 628 (1996) [hereinafter Viscusi, Individual Rationality] (“Tort law
currently is asymmetric in terms of its structure.  Firms may potentially incur tort liability
penalties for underwarning. . . . The uncertainty of whether warnings meet the liability test
consequently provides incentive for firms to overwarn, thus potentially diluting the efficacy of
warning in other contexts as well.”).
202. See FDA Brief, supra note 189, at 6.
203. See id. at 23-24.
204. See Beth Musgrave, Tort Advertisements Worry Some Health Advocates, SUN HERALD
(Biloxi, Miss.), Mar. 21, 2004, at A1 (reporting that “[m]ental health advocates want
Mississippi television stations to quit airing an advertisement that has prompted some mentally
ill patients to stop taking their medications”).
205. See Julia Robb, Mental Illness Robbed Local Woman of Her True Self, MARSHALL (TX)
Where liability-related add-ons tip the cost-benefit balance of producing a
drug, they stifle the research, development, and manufacture of important,
ethical drugs.200
Similarly, if warnings were governed by liability concerns, rational drug
manufacturers would warn for every potential adverse reaction to avoid strict
liability.201  There are two problems with this approach.  First, any warning
that is inconsistent with language approved by the FDA would qualify the drug
as misbranded and subject the manufacturer to enforcement actions.202
Second, according to health advocates, the inclusion of unsubstantiated risks
on a label could deter doctors and patients from making use of a drug, even if
the patient would benefit from the drug and belongs to the class of patients for
whom the risk-benefit trade-off is optimal.203  Such reports already have
materialized in response to negative media attention and trial lawyer
advertising for some drugs.204  The consequences can be severe; for example,
when a severe mental disorder necessitates medication, not taking medication
could put at risk the individual, that person’s family members, and the larger
community.205
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NEWS MESSENGER, Apr. 19, 2004 (reporting that a woman shot her husband after she stopped
taking her medication for schizophrenia).
206. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architect of Government Regulation of Medical Products,
82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1866 (1996) (observing that “[s]o long as FDA possesses final authority
to determine which medical products get marketed, and on what terms, its performance will
frequently disappoint, and often frustrate, manufacturers, patients, and members of Congress”).
207. Stewart, supra note 195, at 2174.
208. Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Preempt Tort Suits, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 1, 2004, at 1,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1076428430132 (quoting
Allison Zieve, an attorney with Public Citizen Litigation Group).
209. Dotson, supra note 117, at 47.
Further, if hundreds of courtrooms around the country made risk-benefit
decisions for a particular drug, the process could produce inconsistent results
and put companies and regulators in catch-22 situations.  Some courts may
conclude that a drug came to the market too quickly and hurt people
unnecessarily.  Public policy makers, including members of Congress, could
find the same drug came to market too slowly to help those in need.206  Also,
some courts could find that warnings were not strong enough, while others
could find that there were too many warnings.  This dichotomy will most
likely arise where the perceived “injustice” of the side effect is greatest. One
commentator notes:
The tort litigation system, unlike the administrative regulatory
system, is generally unable to address the polycentric tradeoffs
presented in regulation of upper-tier risks in the systematic manner
that is required in order to strike a proper balance between risks and
benefits. . . . For example, a decision not to approve a new drug
because of its adverse side effects may deprive sick people of the
therapeutic benefits that the drug would provide.207
A prescription drug system driven by strict liability concerns, therefore,
would make it more difficult for physicians, who rely on prescription drugs
and their warnings to be based on the most advanced scientific knowledge, to
assess which drugs are most appropriate for particular patients.
B. Other Means to Achieve FDA Oversight and Compensation
Still, some support strict liability when prescription drug manufacturers
follow FDA regulations.  These individuals generally make two key points: (1)
“[t]he tort system provides an important check on the regulatory process”;208
and (2) there is no “discussion concerning the need to offer redress for those
who are injured” by prescription drugs.209  While the goals underlying these
statements are important to consider, there are more appropriate and efficient
mechanisms for achieving them than litigation.
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210. See Current Issues Related to Medical Liability Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the H. Energy and Commerce Comm., 109th Cong. 5 (2005) [hereinafter Schwartz
Testimony] (statement of Victor E. Schwartz, General Counsel, American Tort Reform
Association) (on file with authors) (“Not long ago, I remember when the FDA was challenged
because it was not moving quickly enough in providing the American public with drugs that
were needed to fight serious diseases.  Now, among many, there is a contrary feeling — that the
FDA may be moving too quickly and not carefully enough in the drug approval process.  That
debate is an important one to have in Congress, but it is not relevant for a core public policy
decision about whether someone should be punished who has complied with the law.”); see also
William Safire, Editorial, A World of Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2004, at A17 (writing in
response to the VIOXX situation that, “people seeking relief have been afflicted by the
overreaction to reports that several new pain alleviators, taken in large doses by especially
vulnerable patients, may increase the risk of heart problems. . . . Rather than terrorize the F.D.A.
into a cover-your-posterior paralysis, beef up its staff and expand the role of independent review
panels to initiate as well as speedily review trials.”).
211. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
212. See Young, supra note 208 (quoting Rep. Greenwood’s letter as saying that “[s]ome
doctors and advocates are concerned that the lack of publication of these studies distorts the
scientific record”).
213. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2005); see, e.g., Henley v. Food & Drug Admin., 77 F.3d 616 (2d
1. FDA Oversight
The American public has several direct checks on the FDA, including the
President of the United States and the U.S. Congress, which have long
histories of adjusting FDA authority and oversight to enhance safety and
efficacy of prescription drugs.210  The effectiveness of this oversight was seen
most recently in the public reaction to the withdrawal of VIOXX from the
market in autumn 2004 and the controversy over SSRIs (selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors) and their impact on children who suffer from depression.
A congressional investigation and Executive Branch reassessment of VIOXX
led to the creation of an independent auditing group to monitor after-market
results of drug use.211  In addition, Pennsylvania Representative James
Greenwood, who chairs the House Oversight and Investigations Committee,
reacted to reports of suicidal tendencies from those taking SSRIs by
demanding that four SSRI manufacturers turn over to the Congress some of
their unpublished studies — the exact kind of information that plaintiffs’
lawyers argue is only available through discovery.212  It may be worthwhile to
note that these reforms occurred more quickly, uniformly, and in the public
interest than would have been possible through litigation.
In addition, individuals can challenge the FDA’s scientific judgments
without the intervention of the President or Congress.  Through filing Citizen’s
Petitions, the public can object to the FDA’s approval of a drug and its
labeling and ask the FDA to reconsider its findings.213  If a Citizen’s Petition
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Cir. 1996) (ruling on an appeal from a citizen’s petition challenging the warning label for
certain oral contraceptives).
214. Rein, supra note 34, at 3.
215. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1267
(1991) (“[D]efect is the conceptual linchpin that holds products liability law together; a system
of liability without defect is beyond the capacity of courts to implement.”); Wade, Strict Tort
Liability, supra note 125, at 828 (“Strict liability for products is clearly not that of an insurer.
. . . Scope and extent of liability have usually been controlled by the concepts of proximate
cause or risk . . . .”).
216. 2 REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 107 (suggesting that a “national system of
insurance for victims of prescription drug side-effects” would supplant the need for
compensation through liability).  As with all types of insurance, side effect insurance could
efficiently spread loss experienced by the few among the many users of prescription drugs.
Stewart, supra note 195, at 2182 (recommending a “no-fault compensation system for those
injured by products or processes that have previously been approved by regulators as socially
net-beneficial.  For example, a system might be established to cover the economic losses
incurred by those injured by the side effects of FDA-approved drugs.”).
does not result in a satisfactory response, the petitioner can bring an
Administrative Procedure Act proceeding against the agency to force
reconsideration.214
2. Compensation
Certainly, many individuals — including the authors of this article — may
understand the desire to give compensation to those who experience a severe
side effect, particularly when that side effect seems significantly
disproportionate to a drug’s benefit.  But, taking that compensation through the
tort system from a defendant who has complied with the law is not the sound
public policy answer.  Traditional principles of tort law would frown on this
as well, as the law does not hold manufacturers responsible for insuring
against all risks associated with a product.215  Further, a consumer of
prescription drugs implicitly accepts the bargained-for risk of experiencing a
side effect.  As discussed, the patient and her doctor make the decision of
whether or not that risk trade-off is worth taking for a specific patient; the
manufacturer does not have a role in this calculus.
Should a compensation system for victims of severe side effects be
desirable, one can be created.  Some legal observers have suggested that, if
there were clarity in how the legal system handled these cases, private
insurance companies could provide side effect insurance so that those who
sustain debilitating injuries from prescription drugs could receive
compensation.216  Consumer-oriented insurance generally provides
compensation much more accurately and economically than liability insurance,
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217. Victor E. Schwartz, Tort Law Reform: Strict Liability and the Collateral Source Rule
Do Not Mix, 39 VAND. L. REV. 569, 573-74 (1986).
218. Vaccines protect children from debilitating and deadly diseases such as polio, measles,
whooping cough, rubella, tetanus, influenza, mumps, hepatitis, pneumococcal and meningoccal
infections, diphtheria, and smallpox.  See COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF VACCINE PURCHASE
FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES, BD. ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MEDICINE,
FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 24 (2004) [hereinafter FINANCING VACCINES IN
THE 21ST CENTURY] (providing statistics on the change in annual morbidity from vaccine-
preventable diseases); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-17 (2000).  A small percentage of those
children may have a negative reaction to a vaccine and sustain serious injury.  Nevertheless,
many states require every child to be vaccinated from these and other potential diseases in order
to attend public school.  See FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra, at 27-29, 42-
44; Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986:
An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 393-94 (1987).
219. See Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
(“Congress has established a comprehensive regulatory scheme, administered by the FDA, to
control the design and distribution of prescription drugs, including vaccines.”).
220. Stewart, supra note 195, at 2171.
221. Id.
222. See Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 59, 60-61 (1999).
223. See FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 218, at 121-22.  Vaccines
are injected into healthy children as a means of preventing infection or disease.  On rare
occasions, vaccines lead to serious side effects.  See Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Vaccine Side Effects, at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe/concerns/side-effects.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2005).   Parents also blame vaccines for other ailments their children may
derive after being vaccinated.  For example, while scientific studies suggest otherwise,
which is expensive and has high transactional costs.217  The sense, however,
is that as long as courts inconsistently approach prescription drug liability, the
marketplace probably will not provide such solutions.
When this problem arose with the predictable, specific, and known risks
associated with childhood vaccines, Congress recognized that there were
special circumstances for childhood vaccines and established a compensation
fund.218  While the compensation fund mechanism may not be appropriate
where the risks are unknown or not predictable, the developments in litigation
surrounding childhood vaccinations illustrate the public policy issues at play
in this article.219  Between the mid-1960s and early 1980s, cases involving
debilitating injuries to children ostensibly caused by the vaccines generated
“seriously erroneous and inconsistent liability decisions.”220  In many cases,
these verdicts were “directly contrary to regulatory determinations regarding
product risks and benefits,” as well as accepted scientific principles.221
Nevertheless, the claims amounted to more than $3.5 billion between 1980 and
1986,222 leading more than half of all commercial vaccine manufacturers to
stop producing vaccines.223  Vaccine prices rose precipitously, stockpiles of the
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numerous parents blame their children’s autism on the mercury preservative used in some
vaccines. See Thomas H. Maugh II, New Autism Cases Level Off in State, Data Show, L.A.
TIMES, July 12, 2005, at B6.  As a result, damages in childhood vaccine suits can be
significantly high.  Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 218, at 388 (noting that there is an
unavoidable risk that the Sabin Polio vaccine can in rare cases cause the recipient and persons
coming in contact with the recipient to develop polio).
224. See Ridgway, supra note 222, at 61; H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4-5 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat. 3743) 6344, 6345.
225. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6348.
226. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-17
(2000).  In enacting the Vaccine Act in 1986, Congress met two basic concerns: “the
inadequacy — from both the perspective of vaccine-injured persons as well as vaccine
manufacturers — of the current approach to compensating those who have been damaged by
a vaccine; and . . . the instability and unpredictability of the childhood vaccine market.”  H.R.
REP. NO. 99-908, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348.
227. Individuals who seek to recover more than $1000 or an unspecified amount for injuries
allegedly due to childhood vaccines must file a claim in the Federal Court of Claims to be
adjudicated by a special master.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A).  The government is the
defendant in this proceeding, rather than the vaccine manufacturers.  See id. § 300aa-12(b).
Damages are paid for by a fund created by a tax on all vaccines.  See 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2000).
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a).  Congress also prohibited claims for punitive damages.
As the Committee Report for the Vaccine Act recognized,
punitive damages should be assessed only where particularly reprehensible,
conscious behavior is involved.  Where a manufacturer has attempted in good
faith to comply with a government standard — even if the standard provides
inadequate protection to the public — the manufacturer should not be assessed
punitive damages absent evidence that it engaged in reprehensible behavior that
directly resulted in the establishment of maintenance of the standard’s inadequacy.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 28-29, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6369, 6370.
229. See Stewart, supra note 195, at 2172 (stating that there is concern that liability is
inhibiting the development of certain drugs and adult vaccines, such as a vaccine for AIDS);
see also Jon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccines?, SCIENCE, Apr. 10, 1992, at 168, 168
(“Some pharmaceutical companies and biotech companies, concerned about potential damage
suits, are taking a tentative approach to the development of an AIDS vaccine.”).
vaccines dropped to dangerous levels, and often only a single manufacturer
produced each of several childhood vaccines.224  Many feared that the country
was on the brink of a public health hazard.225
Led by California Representative Henry Waxman, Congress created the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP),226 a no-fault fund to
compensate those who experienced negative side effects from childhood
vaccines.227  Claimants could recover medical expenses, reasonable attorney’s
fees, and up to $250,000 for pain and suffering.228  As indicated, this approach
can only work for very specific, named, and predictable risks.229  
A claimant not wanting to be limited by the fund’s compensation
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230. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a).
231. See id. §§ 300aa-22(a)(2), 300aa-22(b); H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 25-26, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6368, 6369.  The only cases appropriate for the courts were where a
manufacturer faced charges of fraud, misrepresentation, or other illegal activity concerning the
safety of the vaccine, or allegations that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care.  See §§
42 U.S.C. 300aa-22(a)(2), 300aa-23(d)(2).
232. See Ridgway, supra note 222, at 76-77. Recently, plaintiffs’ lawyers have sought to
circumvent the VICP.  For example, plaintiffs’ lawyers have argued that thimerosal, a
preservative included in many vaccines, is an “adulterant” or “contaminant.”  They argue that
for this reason claims alleging harm from thimerosal are excluded specifically by the Vaccine
Act’s definition of “vaccine-related injury.”  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-33(5).  Most courts have
rejected such claims.  As one court said, “every federal court to have ruled on the issue has held
that injuries resulting from Thimerosal contained in vaccines are vaccine-related under the
meaning of the Act.”  Bertrand v. Aventis Pasteur Labs., Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (D.
Ariz. 2002).  Still, the four manufacturers of children’s vaccines, as well as pediatricians and
other health care providers, are facing about 190 individual and class action lawsuits in state and
federal courts with “millions of plaintiffs alleging potential thimerosal-related injuries.”  See
Letter from Elizabeth J. Noyes, Chair of the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines, to
Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services (Dec. 6, 2002) (on file with
author).  The lawsuits allege that the preservative in childhood vaccines causes such health
disorders as autism, attention deficit disorders, and learning disorders.  See id.  The huge
potential liability exposure and defense fees in these cases can crush companies.  See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILDHOOD VACCINES: ENSURING AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY POSES
CONTINUING CHALLENGES(GAO-02-987) 24-25  (Sept. 2002) (discussing liability concerns and
defense costs as factors leading to vaccine shortages).
mechanism could still seek judicial action.230  In concert with the legal theories
discussed in this article, Congress clarified that in litigation, a vaccine
manufacturer would not face liability for any unavoidable side effects where
the manufacturer properly prepared the vaccine and included proper directions
and warnings as determined by the FDA.231  Since this legislation was enacted,
childhood immunization has increased, supplies have remained stable, and
wholesale prices have decreased.232
VI. How Courts Should Handle Prescription Drug Litigation
As this article demonstrates, when litigation arises out of side effects from
prescription drugs, courts should allow the FDA to establish the standard of
care for design and warning defect and focus the litigation on areas not
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233. Some reports note that the FDA’s regulatory oversight, particularly with respect to
direct-to-consumer advertising, has been limited due to resource constraints and changes in the
Department of Health and Human Services’ policy for review that serves to lengthen review
time, often beyond the effective period.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS (GAO-03-
177) (Oct. 2002).
234. See generally Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry
in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000) (distinguishing an FDA compliance defense
from federal preemption); Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability:
Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461 (1997) (discussing the merits of
the regulatory compliance defense).
235. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
236. See id.  See generally Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J.
2085 (2000) (discussing the various considerations for reviewing the preemptive nature of
federal regulation).
237. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
238. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55
MD. L. REV. 1210, 1232 (1996) [hereinafter Ausness, “Strong” Regulatory Compliance].
239. M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations, 21
PACE L. REV. 103, 140-41 (2000) (observing that the FDA has accepted its role in establishing
national standards for marketing and manufacturing prescription drugs and has approached its
regulation and enforcement responsibilities accordingly).
240. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996).
governed by exacting FDA regulations.233  The court has two mechanisms for
doing so: federal preemption and the regulatory compliance defense.234
A. Preemption
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,235 federal law or
regulatory regimes can displace — or “preempt” — state legislative,
regulatory, or judicial decisions.236  When a federal law includes an express
preemption provision, it has priority over conflicting state laws.  When such
a preemption provision does not exist, states generally can assume that federal
law does not preempt state law.  But, according to the United States Supreme
Court, the assumption of “nonpre-emption is not triggered . . . where there has
been a history of significant federal presence.”237
The FDA’s enabling statutes do not include an express preemption
provision for prescription drugs.238  Therefore, courts would have to consider
whether the FDA’s regulatory regime impliedly preempts state tort law.239  The
first consideration is whether the FDA regulatory regime is so pervasive that
it “occupies the field” such that state-by-state actions would frustrate “the full
purposes and objectives” of the FDA’s mandate.240  The Reporters’ Study has
observed that where the “Federal standard sets the optimal balance, then state
laws that diverge from it — either to relax or tighten regulations — are in
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241. 2 REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 108.
242. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (stating that state
action cannot stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress”) (citations omitted).  The FDA has argued that Congress made the
FDA the gatekeeper to decide which warnings are “scientifically substantiated.”  FDA Brief,
supra note 189, at 4-5, 23.
243. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
244. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000).
245. See, e.g., Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 984 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 358 F.3d
659 (9th Cir. 2004); see also James Dabney Miller, FDA Should Propose Rule on Federal
Preemption of Failure-to-Warn Lawsuits, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found.), Sept.
19, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.wlf.org/Publishing/pubsbyyear.asp?year=2003
(suggesting that “[i]n light of [the FDA’s] amicus position in Motus that the FDCA preempts
all or at least some failure-to-warn claims, FDA should begin a notice-and-comment rulemaking
on a proposed regulation that would set out the precise boundaries of state-law failure-to-warn
claims that are preempted”).
246. FDA Brief, supra note 189, at 16; see also Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F.2d 1173,
1179 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[A]ssuming that the FDA has processed all the relevant and available
information in arriving at the prescribed warning, its decision as to the proper wording must
preempt by implication that of a state.”)
247. See Miller, supra note 245, at 3.
248. 88 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2004).
249. See id. at 3.
‘conflict’ with the ‘federal purpose’ and therefore preempted.”241  Also,
consideration should be given to whether separate risk-benefit analyses in each
jurisdiction for each prescription drug would undermine a national uniform
regulatory regime.242  Where courts determine that there is “no room” left for
state action, FDA regulations preempt tort law.243
Implied preemption also occurs when state tort law is in actual conflict with
an FDA regulation244 — an argument the FDA has made in several recent
amicus curiae briefs.245  In Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., for example, the FDA stated
that “state law may require the manufacturer of a drug to warn of a specific
danger that the FDA, based on scientific analysis, concludes does not exist.”246
The problem, as explained by the FDA, is that if a prescription drug
manufacturer were to abide by such state law, the FDA would consider the
drug “misbranded” and conduct enforcement actions against the manufacturer.
Thus, a drug manufacturer could not abide by both the “regulation” imposed
by the state court through liability and the regulations issued by the FDA.247
The Supreme Court of California agreed with the FDA in Dowhal v.
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare,248 a 2004 decision striking down
a state-required warning for pregnant women pertaining to all products
containing nicotine, including those that help people stop smoking.249  The
court observed that the case presented a “complex labeling issue because . . .
the purpose of the products is to help individuals stop smoking, and smoking
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250. Id. at 4.
251. Id. at 5.  “[T]he FDA has authority to prohibit truthful statements on a product label if
they are ‘misleading’ or if they are not stated in ‘such manner and form, as are necessary for the
protection of users.’”  Id. at 12 (citations omitted).  But see Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a state law failure to warn claim was not preempted by FDA
regulations).
252. See generally Ausness, “Strong” Regulatory Compliance, supra note 238.
253. See id.
254. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (the court deferred to the
FDA to regulate the prescription drug market in the absence of state tort liability); Grundberg
v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (deferring to the FDA regulatory regime instead of
subjecting prescription drug manufacturers to state tort liability).
255. See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90.
256. See Stewart, supra note 195, at 2180-81.
257. Id.
is even more dangerous to the fetus.”250  The FDA label should prevail, the
court said, because it represented “an effort to balance these competing
concerns.”251  While the anti-smoking products were available without a
prescription, the same principles apply to prescription drugs.
B. Judicial Regulatory Compliance Defense
The regulatory compliance defense is the flip-side of preemption, as the
authority rests with the states, rather than the federal government.252  Under the
regulatory compliance defense, courts use their own authority to establish a
common law deference to the FDA’s regulatory scheme for prescription
drugs.253  As discussed earlier in this article, several state high courts, such as
those in California, Washington and Utah, have adopted, as a practical matter,
a regulatory compliance defense for prescription drugs.254
In these jurisdictions, a prescription drug manufacturer does not face strict
liability for design defect or failure to warn when it has met the FDA duty of
care for reasonable research, instructions, and warnings.255  Thus, to be eligible
for this protection, a company must have disclosed to the FDA all material
information in its possession relating to hazards or safe use.256 
[This] disclosure condition serves to enlist the energies of
plaintiffs’ lawyers in ferreting out instances of firms’
nondisclosure, so that plaintiffs can proceed with tort claims. . . . It
may be even more effective than the current tort system in
accomplishing this goal because it makes detection and revelation
of nondisclosure a precondition for maintaining a tort claim.257
As the Reporters’ Study observed more than a decade ago, the prescription
drug market presents the “special combination of circumstances justifying” a
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258. 2 REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 103-04 (concluding generally that where serious
risks are involved and the pharmaceutical is needed to treat a major illness, the “advantages of
consistent regulation over case by case litigation are likely to be greatest”).
259. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2000) (“In a product liability
action against a manufacturer or seller, a product that is a drug is not defective or unreasonably
dangerous, and the manufacturer or seller is not liable, if the drug was approved for safety and
efficacy by the United States food and drug administration, and the drug and its labeling were
in compliance with the United States food and drug administration's approval at the time the
drug left the control of the manufacturer or seller.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (2004)
(“Compliance by a manufacturer or seller with any federal or state statute or administrative
regulation existing at the time a product was manufactured and prescribing standards for design,
inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warning or instructions for use of a product, shall
raise a rebuttable presumption that the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition
in regard to matters covered by these standards.”).
260. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5); see also Taylor v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., 658 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Mich. 2003) (upholding the state constitutionality of
codifying of a law stating that “a manufacturer or seller of a drug that has been approved by the
FDA has an absolute defense to a products liability claim if the drug and its labeling were in
compliance with the FDA’s approval at the time the drug left control of the manufacturer or
seller”).
261. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(A) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4, 5(c) (West
1985 & Supp. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80 (LexisNexis 2004); OR. REV. ST. §
30.927 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(1) (2002). 
262. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1 (LexisNexis
2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (1995 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2)
regulatory compliance defense: (1) public health benefits depend heavily on
innovation; (2) the regulatory regime “carefully balances” risk and benefit per
product; (3) inherent harms that cannot be prevented through liability or
regulation; (4) the regulatory controls are part of a detailed regime; (5) the
regulations demand pervasive reporting requirements; (6) there already exists
a strong market incentive to generate safe products; and (7) the activity is sale
of uniform, national products.258
C. Legislative Regulatory Compliance Defense
Several state legislatures have used their state’s authority to codify a
regulatory compliance defense for prescription drugs.259  In Michigan, the
legislature specifically yielded to FDA regulations for establishing tort liability
for prescription drugs.260  Other states, including Arizona, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, and Utah have limited liability for punitive damages when
manufacturers complied with FDA regulations.261  In addition, states such as
Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Utah have enacted laws
providing that compliance with federal or state government safety regula-
tions — for all products, not just prescription drugs — creates a rebuttable
presumption that a product is not defective.262
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(West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3).
263. See Schwartz Testimony, supra note 210, at 7.
264. 2005 Ohio Laws File 144 (Am. Sub. S.B. 80) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.80) (effective Apr. 7, 2005).
265. See Fiscal Year 2006 Hearing on Substance Abuse and Mental Health Research
Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Servs., and Educ of the
H. Comm. on. Appropriations, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Dr. Thomas R. Insel, Director,
Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health), available at 2005 WL 996064 (discussing the risks of suicide
among children for depression generally as well as the debate over whether SSRIs “can actually
increase suicidal thinking”).
266. See generally MICHAEL D. GREEN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE GUIDE ON
EPIDEMIOLOGY, at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman06.pdf/$file/sciman06.pdf
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
267. See Laura Vozzella & Ivan Penn, Lining Up Suits Against Painkillers, BALT. SUN, Dec.
23, 2004, at 1A (reporting on VIOXX litigation and stating that “the anticipated flurry of
lawsuits doesn’t mean the cases will be slam-dunks.  Some personal injury lawyers concede that
the suits will be difficult because heart attacks and strokes — the problems blamed on the
When the law in Ohio was enacted in 1987, those who opposed it predicted
that the drug companies might treat Ohio as part of “Sodom and Gomorra” by
dumping dangerous or defective drugs in the state and dropping damaging
warnings from their packaging.263  There have been no reports of that
happening.  In fact, in 2005 the Ohio legislature expanded coverage of the
statute and banned punitive damages for FDA-compliant manufacturers of
over-the-counter drugs and medical devices, in addition to prescription
drugs.264
VII. The Causation Requirement
Should a case proceed — whether preemption or regulatory compliance was
not appropriate or because some other legal reason prevailed — the court
should take steps to minimize the opportunity for bad science to undermine
both the tort system and the FDA’s ability to set risk strategy for individual
prescription drugs.  The best way to do this would be to make determinations
on both general and specific causation early in the litigation.
Courts first must determine whether the drug in question does cause the
alleged harm.  For example, the controversy over the effect of SSRIs on
children centers on whether the SSRIs actually caused the children to commit
suicide or whether the children committed suicide because of the underlying
state of depression.265  In reaching this decision, courts may be guided by
reports from experts on epidemiological and placebo controlled tests and
whether there is a “signature” disease that a drug is alleged to cause.266  Where
the ailment is common to mankind, such as heart disease or cancer, courts
should tread very carefully.267  Courts must conclusively resolve any
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drugs — are common afflictions with many causes.”).
268. Stewart, supra note 195, at 2169.
uncertainty before specific causation can be raised.  The key issue for specific
causation is whether a drug caused an injury or whether the ingestion of the
drug simply happened before the onset of an illness.
VIII. Conclusion
All prescription drugs are unavoidably dangerous to some of their users.  In
light of that scientific fact, public policy oriented courts have exempted
prescription drugs from strict liability for design and failure to warn defects.
The result is a fault-based system.  
Because the FDA uses a highly scientific and deliberative process to
approve each drug and all warnings, the FDA is entitled to deference in the tort
system.  If the FDA process is flawed, it is the responsibility of Congress and
the Executive Branch, which can view the total picture of the pharmaceutical
regulatory process, to make changes.  When public health events have exposed
weaknesses in the system in the past, the President and Congress have
expanded the FDA’s authority, provided the FDA with more resources to fix
problems, and enhanced independent oversight of the FDA’s work. 
When each court creates different rules for prescription drug liability, the
justice system fails; the public’s interest in having a stable system for
prescription drugs is undermined by unpredictable and sometimes inaccurate
legal outcomes.  Such a decentralized approach does make sense for resolving
private conflicts, but with the national prescription drug market, there is “a
likelihood of erroneous and inconsistent risk-benefit decisions, uncertainty,
and a threat of overdeterrence of socially beneficial products.”268  
This problem becomes most vivid for “upper-tier” risks posed by potent
drugs that come with significant or frequent side effects, but can alleviate
harmful and potentially life-threatening situations.  While this approach may
result in some individuals not receiving compensation through the tort system,
the same is true for many other serious risks in society.  The tort system is not
a compensation system.  If a compensation system is needed for prescription
drugs, policy makers should give that issue a hearing.  But, that attention will
never be obtained if courts allow a roulette system to prevail in pharmaceutical
liability.
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